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Abstract 
Background 
Devastating epidemics of highly contagious animal diseases like avian influenza, classical swine 
fever, and foot-and-mouth disease underline the need for improved understanding of the factors 
promoting the spread of these pathogens. Here we present a spatial analysis of the between-farm 
transmission of a highly pathogenic H7N7 avian influenza virus that caused a large epidemic in The 
Netherlands in 2003. 
 
Methodology/Principal findings 
We develop a method to estimate key parameters determining the spread of highly transmissible 
animal diseases between farms based on outbreak data. The method enables us to identify high-
risk areas for propagating spread in an epidemiologically underpinned manner. A central concept is 
the transmission kernel which determines the probability of pathogen transmission from infected to 
uninfected farms as a function of inter-farm distance. We show how an estimate of the transmission 
kernel naturally provides estimates of the critical farm density and local reproduction numbers, 
which allows one to evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies. For avian influenza our 
analyses show that there are two poultry-dense areas in The Netherlands where epidemic spread is 
possible, and in which local control measures are unlikely to be able to halt an unfolding epidemic. 
In these regions an epidemic can only be brought to an end by the depletion of susceptible farms by 
infection or massive culling. 
 
Conclusions/Significance 
Our analyses provide an estimate of the spatial range over which highly pathogenic avian influenza 
viruses spread between farms, and emphasize that control measures aimed at controlling such 
outbreaks need to take into account the local density of farms. 
 
Introduction 
Outbreaks of highly contagious animal infections such as foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine 
fever, and highly pathogenic avian influenza traditionally have been and continue to be important 
loss factors in production animals throughout the world. In recent years several large epidemics 
have occurred with serious socio-economic consequences [1-3] and, in the case of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes, also with possible public health 
implications [4-7]. Improved understanding of the factors facilitating the introduction and subsequent 
spread of these viruses is crucial for effective control. An important common characteristic of these 
past epidemics is that a large fraction of farm infections is occurring through local spread between 
nearby farms [8-14]. 
To explain the observed patterns of infection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus between 
farms, and to be able to evaluate the potential effectiveness of control measures we adopt a 
phenomenological modelling approach.  Similar approaches have been used in modelling studies of 
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the inter-farm spread and the effectiveness of control measures during the foot-and-mouth epidemic 
in the United Kingdom in 2001 [8,9,14-18]. The present analysis allows us to produce geographic 
risk maps for the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus between poultry farms. These 
risk maps are based on the calculation of a local reproduction number, and are constructed as to 
apply to a given intervention strategy.   
For estimation of the model parameters we use an extensive dataset that was collected during an 
outbreak of a highly pathogenic H7N7 avian influenza virus in The Netherlands in 2003. Shortly 
after the detection of virus circulation the Dutch authorities undertook an aggressive control strategy 
that consisted of an animal movement ban and enhanced biosecurity measures in the affected 
regions, tracing and screening of suspected flocks, and culling of infected and contiguous flocks. In 
all, 241 commercial flocks became infected during a period of nine weeks, and more than 30 million 
birds died by infection and culling.  
A striking characteristic of the 2003 epidemic was that most of the infected farms were confined to 
two areas with a high density of poultry farms. In fact, it was noted that proximity to an infected herd 
was a significant risk factor for acquiring infection [19]. This is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows a 
map of The Netherlands with the physical locations of all 5360 commercial poultry farms. Farms 
that remained free of infection during the epidemic are indicated by a yellow dot, and those that 
were infected are represented by a black dot. The figure shows that most infections were confined 
to a large poultry-dense of approximately 1000 farms in the central part of The Netherlands (the 
Gelderse Vallei), and a smaller poultry-dense area of almost 400 farms in the south of The 
Netherlands.   
As a first step to gain further insight into the spatial transmission characteristics of the 2003 
epidemic, we plot in Figure 2A the between-farm distances of all potential transmission events (i.e. 
new infections being caused by candidate source farms). The figure shows that the majority of the 
potential transmission events were within a radius of 25 km around infected farms, suggesting that 
infection probabilities decrease with between-farm distance. This suggestion is corroborated in 
Figure 2B, in which we plot for each distance category the fraction of farms that are potentially 
infected by an infected farm, averaged over all infected farms. Notice the small hump at a distance 
of 90-110 km in both panels, which arises due to the distance between the two infection clusters. 
Our more detailed analyses below confirm that the probability of infection decreases strongly as the 
distance between farms increases. In fact, the probability that a farm that is close to an infected 
farm (0-2 km) will be infected by that farm is between 1 and 2 percent, while farms that are further 
away from an infected farm (>10 km) have a probability of less than 0.05 percent of being infected 
by that farm. Our analyses also reveal that there are two high-risk poultry-dense areas in The 
Netherlands in which an introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus is likely to cause a 
major epidemic. In these areas targeted control strategies such as vaccination or culling of farms 
within a ring of 1-2 km around affected premises are unlikely to be effective in containing an 
epidemic. On the other hand, culling in a wider ring of 3-5 km may be effective, although the 
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number of farms that has to be culled around each infected farm may become very large (>100 per 
infected farm). 
 
Methods 
Data 
The analyses rely on the availability of two pieces of information. The first is the spatial locations of 
all farms that are at risk of infection and subsequent transmission to uninfected farms. The second 
is an assessment of the infection status (uninfected, infected but not yet infectious, infected and 
infectious, removed) of each farm during the epidemic. While the former data are relatively easy to 
retrieve and can be collected before or after an epidemic, the latter require a considerable effort of 
data collection during the epidemic. In short, as the epidemic unfolded an attempt was undertaken 
to record for all infected farms the key demographic characteristics (number of barns, number of 
animals, type of animals, age of the animals) and data of epidemiological interest (number of dead 
animals per day, number of sick animals per day, food and water intake per day). By no means 
could all of the above information be collected for all farms, although the day at which mortality first 
increased and the moment of culling were reported for all farms. In our analyses, farms were 
assumed to be infected six days before the day on which mortality first increased. Upon infection 
each farms then remained latently infected for two days, after which it was assumed to be infectious 
until culling. For a more detailed description of the epidemic, including detailed case reports of the 
first five infected premises we refer to [19-20]. 
Technically, the infection data are collected in an maxtn ×  infection matrix ( )ijc=C , the elements 
of which contain the infection status of all n farms during the maxt  days of the epidemic. For the 
Dutch outbreak we have 5360=n  and 78max =t  [19]. On each day a farm is classified as 
susceptible (S), being infected on that day (B), infected but not infectious (E), infectious (I), or 
removed (R). Hence, Scij =  if farm i  is still susceptible on day j , Bcij =  if it is infected on day 
j , etcetera. As discussed and evaluated in [19] there is a certain extent of uncertainty in the 
infection dates and days on which farms have become infectious. Below we evaluate the sensitivity 
of our results to assumptions leading to the infection matrix C . The infection matrix can be 
downloaded from the Dataset S1. 
The farm location data take the form of a list of n 2-dimensional Euclidean location vectors 
( )iii yx ,=r .  From this list we construct an nn ×  distance matrix D  which contains the pair-wise 
distances between farms. For reasons of privacy we cannot make the data file containing the exact 
locations of all farms in The Netherlands available (but see [21] for ways of constructing an 
approximate dataset). 
 
Modelling approach and reproduction numbers 
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The model is defined on a farm level, i.e. farms are the individual units. These individual units differ 
by their location and infection status, and are considered identical in all other respects. This 
simplification (in particular ignoring differences in farm size) is made because more detailed 
modelling introduces additional parameters that can not be estimated with sufficient precision to 
add further insight into the spatial transmission risk. The infection matrix C  discussed above 
specifies how each farm’s status (S, B, E, I or R) developed through time during the epidemic in 
2003. The model assumes that the probability ( )ijrp  that an uninfected farm j  will be infected by 
an infected farm i  depends only on the infectious period iT  of farm i  and on the (Euclidean) 
distance jiijr rr −=  between the farms, and is given by ( ) ( )( )iijij Trhrp −−= exp1 . The 
function ( )ijrh  is called the transmission kernel, and is defined as the infection hazard posed by 
farm i  to farm j as a function of inter-farm distance [8,9,14,18]. In the next section we describe how 
the transmission kernel ( )ijrh  is estimated from the data matrices C  and D . 
With estimates of the transmission kernel at hand a risk map can be constructed in the following 
way.  At every farm location we calculate the (basic) reproduction numberR , which equals the 
expected number of secondary infections caused by one infected farm in the early stages of an 
epidemic (i.e. before the depletion of susceptible farms starts to play a role). If 1>R  the pathogen 
is able to cause a major epidemic while it cannot if 1<R . If we denote the density of farms at a 
distance r  from a focal farm i  by ( )riρ , then standard arguments show that the reproduction 
number of farm i  is to a good approximation given by 
( ) ( )∫∞=
0
2 drrrprR ii ρπ .         (1)    
For more accurate approximations taking into account the effects of local depletion of susceptible 
farms we refer to [22]. If farm density were constant ( ρρ =i ), the individual reproduction numbers 
are identical, and the above expression simplifies to 
( )∫∞=
0
2 drrrpR πρ .         (2) 
The integrand ( )rrp  in the above expression determines the contribution of farms at distance r  
to the reproduction number. Notice that the reproduction number in the above equation is 
proportional to the farm density. The critical farm density cρ  is given by the solution of the 
equation 1=R . Using the above result for R  this yields 
( )
1
0
2
−
∞
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= ∫ drrrpc πρ          (3) 
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The above equations show that, under certain assumptions, the reproduction number can be 
translated into a farm density and vice versa. In particular, the threshold condition 1=R  for 
epidemic spread translates into a critical farm density. 
The above theoretical considerations assume that farm density is constant. This is hardly ever true 
in practice and we need to take into account the actual distribution of farms. For a specific 
distribution of farms and assuming a stochastic infectious period iT  the reproduction number iR  of 
farm i  is given by 
( ) ( )[ ]( ),1∑∑
≠
−
≠
−=
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
=
ij
Trh
ij
iji
iijeErpER         (4) 
where the index in runs across all farms in the population except the focal farm.  
Equation (4) gives the expected number of infections caused by an infected farm in the early stages 
of an outbreak. For completeness we note that not only the expected number of infections (i.e. the 
reproduction numbers) but also the complete offspring distribution (i.e. the distribution of the 
number of farms infected by a single infected farm in the early stages of an epidemic) can be 
determined by simulation using the elements in the summation of eqn. (4). It appears that the 
resulting distributions are almost indistinguishable to Poisson distributions with parameters iR  
(results not shown). This phenomenon can be explained theoretically if the individual farm 
contributions are determined by an (inhomogeneous) Poisson process. In our model this condition 
would hold true if the farm locations are generated by an (inhomogeneous) Poisson process.  
Simulations show that for the Dutch farm data the Poisson approximation gives an excellent 
description of the actual offspring distribution, even though the farm locations are highly 
overdispersed (results not shown). 
If the infectious periods are drawn from a parametric distribution an explicit expression for iR  can 
usually be obtained. For instance, if the infectious periods arise from a common gamma distribution 
with shape parameter c  and scale parameter cT  then the reproduction number of farm i  is given 
by 
( ) ,1∑≠ ⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−=
ij
c
ij
i rhTc
cR          (5) 
where T  and c1  are the mean and variance of the infectious period probability distribution, 
respectively. Here the special cases of a fixed or exponentially distributed infectious period are 
obtained by letting ∞→c  or by taking 1=c , respectively. 
Below we obtain a risk map for epidemic spread by drawing a map in which all commercial poultry 
farms are indicated by a dot, representing those farms with iR >1 by a red dot. This identifies high-
risk areas as red areas on the map. 
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Parameter estimation 
In order to obtain quantitative estimates for the local reproduction numbers, we need estimates of 
both the transmission kernel ( )ijrh  and the (distribution of the) infectious period iT .  
The infectious periods at the farm level were obtained from the infection matrix C . The mean 
infectious period of the 241 farms that were infected was 7.47 days (95%CI=(7.2-7.8)). On the basis 
of these data we took 47.7=T  and 1.11=c  in eqn. (5).  
We estimate the transmission kernel ( )ijrh  from the data matrices C  and D  by means of 
maximum likelihood [8,14,18]. In line with previous studies [9,14] we parameterise the transmission 
kernel using a three-parameter logistic expression:  
( ) ( )α0
0
1 rr
hrh
+
= .          (6) 
To evaluate the performance of the transmission kernel specified by eqn. (6) we considered a 
number of alternative functions, and compared the performance of the kernel specified by eqn. (6) 
with the alternatives on the basis of Akaike’s Information Criterion [23]. The results are discussed 
below. 
To derive the model likelihood we define the force of infection ( )tiλ  on a susceptible farm i  by: 
( ) ( ) [ ]infectious is j
ij
jii rht 1∑
≠
=λ          (7) 
(1  represents the indicator function). The force of infection determines the probability ( )tq i  that a 
hitherto susceptible farm i  is infected on day t , 
( ) ( ),1 ti ietq λ−−=           (8) 
and the probability ( )tri  that farm i  remains uninfected up to day t  , 
( ) ( ).
1
1
∑−
=
−
=
t
s
i s
i etr
λ
          (9) 
Using eqns. (8)-(9) the likelihood function takes the following form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )mfinmmfin
m
mlcul
l
l
k
k tqtrtrtrL ,,,max ∏∏∏
Μ∈Λ∈Κ∈
= ,     (10) 
where the set Κ  contains all farms that remained uninfected and that were not culled, Λ  contains 
the farms that were not infected but that were culled (at times lcult , ), and Μ contains the farms that 
were infected (at times mfint , ). In practice it is computationally more efficient to use the log-
likelihood ( )Llog=?  instead of the likelihoodL . Using eqns. (8)-(10) the log-likelihood can be 
written in terms of the forces of infection as follows:  
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ).1log1,
1
1
1
1
1
,
,max ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑
Λ∈
−
= Μ∈
−
Μ∈
−
=Κ∈
−
=
−+−−−=
l
lcult
t m
t
m
t
t
ml
k
t
t
k
mfinm
mfin
ettt λλλλ?       (11) 
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The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of interest ( 0hˆ , 0ˆr , and αˆ ) are readily 
obtained by maximization of eqn. (11). The confidence bounds of the parameters (Table 1) are 
calculated using profile likelihoods. The 95% confidence bounds of the transmission kernel shown 
in Figure 2 are calculated by determining, at any given distance, the range of values spanned by 
the kernel when the kernel parameters run across the 95% confidence volume (as determined by 
the profile likelihood). Below we comment on the sensitivity of the results with respect to the spatial 
range of the farms that were included in the estimation procedure. 
Mathematica 5.2 was used for all data processing, modelling, and statistical analyses. Figures 1, 4, 
and 5 were also produced using Mathematica 5.2. Figures 2 and 3 were produced using SigmaPlot 
10.0. 
 
Results 
High-risk areas for epidemic spread 
Table 1 shows the parameter estimates of the transmission kernel describing the transmission rate 
from infected to uninfected farms as a function of inter-farm distance, and Figure 3 displays the 
transmission kernel for these parameter estimates. The transmission rate decreases from an 
estimated 2.1*10-3 (day-1) in the direct neighbourhood of an infected farm to 1.6*10-3 (day-1) at 1 km, 
and to 6.1*10-5 (day-1) at 10 km distance. This implies that the probability that a given farm will be 
infected if it is at 0 km, 1 km, or 10 km from an infected farm is approximately 0.016, 0.012, and 
4.6*10-4 if the infectious period is 7.5 days. Figure 3 also shows the uncertainty associated with the 
estimate of the transmission kernel. At short distances the uncertainty is largest because the 
number of data points is lower here as there are far fewer farms at short distances than there are at 
long distances.  
Figure 4 shows a risk map of The Netherlands based on the kernel estimate of Figure 3. Farms in 
yellow are expected to produce less than 1 new infection if infected (i.e. 1<iR ), while farms in red 
are expected to produce more than 1 new infection if infected ( 1>iR ). Farms in pink do not have a 
reproduction number larger than 1 for the maximum likelihood estimate of the transmission kernel, 
but do have a reproduction number exceeding 1 for the 95% confidence upper bound of the 
transmission kernel in Figure 3. Areas in which farms with 1>iR  predominate are at risk of 
epidemic spread, while an epidemic cannot occur in areas in which farms with 1<iR  prevail.  
The analysis shows that there are two areas in The Netherlands that are at risk of a locally 
propagating epidemic after a virus introduction: one large area in the central part of the country 
comprising 913 farms (95% confidence bounds of the high-risk area: 685-1065) and one small area 
in the South of 61 farms (95% confidence bounds of the high-risk area: 0-206). In those two areas 
the local density of poultry farms is such that an infected farm is expected to produce a substantial 
number of subsequent infections.  
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A comparison of Figure 1 which shows the farms that were actually infected during the 2003 
epidemic and Figure 4 which shows the areas (farms) that are calculated to have a high-risk of 
epidemic spread shows that there is a good agreement between the two. In fact, using the 
estimated transmission kernel 162 of the 241 infected farms are also classified as being in a high-
risk area by our method, while 79 of the infected farms were located in areas that are classified as 
having a low risk of epidemic spread. The correspondence becomes improves further if one takes 
the 95% confidence upper bound of the transmission kernel as the basis of analysis, thereby adding 
a number of pink farms in Figure 4 to the high-risk area (189 infections in high-risk areas versus 52 
in low-risk areas). Altogether, our classification scheme appears to work very well in general, 
although there remain a number of infected farms in areas that are classified as low-risk. 
Fortunately, and as predicted by our method, these infections in the low-density areas did not spark 
new infection foci in the 2003 epidemic. 
At this point we would like to note that, in order not to miss or underestimate the size of high-risk 
areas close to the Dutch border, we have incorporated the poultry farms in the Belgian provinces 
and German administrative areas (NUTS2 administrative levels) bordering The Netherlands in our 
calculations (both in the kernel estimation and in the risk-map calculation). As we do not have 
access to location data for the farms in these regions, we have approximated the farm structure of 
these regions by generating random model locations on the surface of these regions according to a 
homogeneous Poisson point process. The total number of model locations per region was matched 
to Eurostat data (website: ec.europa.eu/eurostat/) on the total numbers of farms by region.  
To investigate the robustness the above results we have performed a suite of sensitivity analyses. 
We have paid particular attention to the functional form of the transmission kernel, the range of 
farms included in the estimation procedure, the assumptions leading to the infection data matrix, 
and the assumed constancy of the transmission level over time. Below we discuss each of these 
aspects in turn. 
 
Alternative transmission kernels 
As a first step to investigate the sensitivity of the above results we considered a number of different 
functions of varying complexity for the transmission kernel. The performance of the different kernels 
was evaluated on the basis of the support received by Akaike’s Information Criterion [22]. The 
results of the analyses are summarized in Table 2. In general, the analyses show that simpler 
kernels with only one or two parameters fit the data significantly worse than our default three-
parameter logistic equation (i.e. eqn. (6)), which has by far the highest support. This indicates that 
we stood away from overfitting the data. 
Table 2 shows that of the distance-based models a kernel without any distance-dependence in the 
transmission risk ( ( ) 0hrh = ) gives by far the worst fit to the data and has negligible support in 
comparison with models that do include some form of negative distance-dependence. These results 
imply that the risk of transmission is not constant but decreases with inter-farm distance. In 
particular, the results of Table 2 indicate that models that do not allow a rapid decrease of the 
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transmission kernel at long distances perform much worse than models in which the tail of the 
transmission kernel quickly drops of to very low values (i.e. for which the tail is at least of the order 
αr1  where 2>α ). This implies that farms at very long distances contribute marginally to the farm 
reproduction numbers, even though there are many more farms at long than at short and 
intermediate distances. 
To further investigate the sensitivity of our results we considered alternative transmission models in 
which the transmission kernel does not depend on the Euclidean distance between farms, but on 
the distance rank of infected farms to susceptible farms, or the distance rank of susceptible farms to 
infected farms (see [24] for still other alternatives]). In a hypothetical situation where most of the 
transmission takes place through human contacts between farms, such models would be 
appropriate whenever there is a fixed rate at which people visit neighbouring farms but are more 
likely to visit nearby farms than those that are further away. Simulations based on estimates of the 
rank-based transmission kernels show that these models are unable to capture the patterns of 
infection of the Dutch epidemic (results not shown). In particular, these models predict that 
occasional infections in the low-density areas will not remain isolated but cause new clusters of 
epidemic spread in the low-density areas. Hence, the rank-based models predict that epidemics 
that are started in the high-density area in the central part of The Netherlands will ultimately spread 
all over The Netherlands. 
 
Range of farms included in the kernel estimation 
Our kernel estimates are based on all commercial farms in The Netherlands. Since The 
Netherlands is a small country (35,000km2), this implies that the kernel parameter estimates are 
based mainly on pairs of farms that are less than 150 km apart. To investigate the sensitivity of the 
results to the range of distances for which information is available we have repeated the kernel 
estimation using an extended dataset in which the distribution of poultry farms outside The 
Netherlands was taken into account. Specifically, we approximated Europe by one half of an 
annular area of inner radius of 200 km and an outer radius of 1600 km with an uniform poultry farm 
density equal to the mean poultry density of the 24 non-Dutch EU member states (website: 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/) and re-estimated the transmission kernel.  
The results show that the inclusion of farms outside of The Netherlands (and the information that 
these had not been infected) only marginally affects the estimated local reproduction numbers, 
yielding risk-maps that are indistinguishable from those in Figures 4 and 5 (not shown). However, 
we do find that the kernel parameter estimates are changed considerably as compared to the 
default analysis (Table 1). This paradox arises due to neutralizing effects between the three 
parameter shifts. The net result of the changes in the three parameters is a mere lowering of the 
long-distance tail of the transmission kernel, mostly due to the higher estimated value for the 
parameter α . The kernel hardly changes at short and intermediate distance scales, which together 
are the dominant contributors to the local reproduction numbers. 
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Uncertainty in the temporal course of the epidemic 
In the above analyses we assumed perfect knowledge of the course of the epidemic in The 
Netherlands in 2003. There is, however, some uncertainty in the data with regard to the infection 
matrix C , in particular with respect to the precise moment of infection of infected farms. To 
investigate the sensitivity of the results to assumptions underlying the infection matrix we carried 
out additional analyses in which the moment of introduction was placed two days later than in our 
default analyses (see [19] for details). The sensitivity analysis (Table 1) shows that the decrease in 
the infectious period by two days is offset by a corresponding increase in the height of the 
transmission kernel such that the individual farm-level reproduction numbers remain roughly the 
same (results not shown). In particular, the baseline infection hazard parameter 0h  increases from 
an estimated 0.0020 (day-1) in our default scenario to 0.0028 (day-1) in the additional analyses. 
Hence, the sensitivity analysis indicates that although the estimates of the parameters of the 
transmission kernel (in particular the baseline infection hazard 0h ) are sensitive to the moment of 
introduction and length of the infectious period, the risk map of Figure 4 is remarkably insensitive to 
the precise assumptions leading to the infection data matrix. We observed the same phenomenon 
in our earlier non-spatial analysis of the same epidemic [19]. 
 
The high-risk versus low-risk period 
The above analyses assume that both the infectious period at the farm level as well as the 
transmission kernel remained constant throughout the epidemic. This, however, is only 
approximately the case. Especially during the first week of the epidemic there were no or hardly any 
control measures in place, and the detection of infected farms was still imperfect and slow. In line 
with our earlier non-spatial analyses [19] we have therefore performed analyses of the period 
before and after relevant control measures had been put in place (i.e. 1 March 2003). The results of 
the analyses, shown in Table 1, illustrate that both the infectious period as well as the height of the 
transmission kernel at short distances (<4 km) was considerably higher in the high-risk period as 
compared with the low-risk period. On the other hand, at long distances (>4 km) the transmission 
kernel was somewhat higher in the low-risk period as compared to the low-risk period. This may 
seem counterintuitive, but it should be noted that the parameter estimates of the high-risk period 
were based on a fairly small number of infected farms and on a small number of days. The 
differences between the transmission kernels of the two analyses may seem large (as judged by 
the differences in the parameter estimates) but in fact the transmission kernels are quite similar at 
the medium-range distances (2-5 km) that contribute most to the local reproduction numbers. The 
risk maps that are constructed using the parameter estimates pertaining to the high-risk and low-
risk periods are much alike the risk map for the analysis in which the epidemic is analysed in one 
go. For instance, the number of high-risk farms in the central area of The Netherlands in the default 
analysis contained 913 farms (see above), while the number of high-risk farms in the analyses of 
the high-risk and low-risk periods contained 1015 and 863 farms.  
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Local containment  
Next to a movement ban and biosecurity measures there are two potentially attractive local control 
measures: culling of farms in the proximity of infected premises that have a heightened risk of 
infection, and vaccination. We first investigate the effectiveness of rapid culling of all farms in a ring 
around infected farms. The effect of this measure can be described by reducing the height of the 
transmission kernel of the infected farm and/or the length of the infectious period of potential 
contact farms within the culling radius. Here we assume that culling occurs before any infected farm 
in the culling ring start spreading the infection to other farms, so that the intervention can be 
described by setting the transmission kernel of the infected farm to zero at distances within the 
culling radius. Thus the analyses below correspond to a best-case scenario, and assume in effect 
that no transmission takes place from farms within the culling radius. This can probably only be 
achieved if ring culling is carried out in a couple of days after infection of a focal farm.  
Figure 5 shows the results of the analyses for the central part of The Netherlands that was identified 
above as a major high-risk area. Farms that do not constitute a risk are drawn in yellow while farms 
that pose a risk of epidemic spread are depicted in red. The figure shows high-risk farms in case of 
no culling (Figure 5A, cf. Figure 4), in case of culling in a ring of radius 1 km (Figure 5B), and in 
case of culling in a ring of radius 3 km or 5 km (Figure 5C and 5D). Culling of farms in a ring of 1 km 
does not appear to be very effective as the majority of farms that were classified as high-risk 
without culling remain high-risk with a 1 km culling strategy in place. Culling within a ring of 3 km 
radius is more effective, although there are still more than 100 farms that are classified as high-risk, 
i.e. that are expected to produce more than 1 subsequent infection once infected. Culling in a radius 
of 5 km is fully effective in the sense that with this control strategy there are no farms anymore that 
are expected to produce more than 1 subsequent infection once infected. The question remains 
whether rapid culling of all farms in a radius of 5 km around an infected farm is feasible logistically 
as the number of farms that have to be culled increases rapidly with the culling radius. In fact, for 
the high-risk area in the central part of The Netherlands the average density of neighbour farms 
exceeds 4 farms/km2 so that a 5-km ring culling strategy would imply that for each infected farm 
more than 300 farms have to be culled within a couple of days ( 31442514.32 =××=ρπ r ). If 
the infection has spread already within this high-risk area at the time of the first detection, this 
implies that the majority of the about 913 farms in the area would need to be culled. Apart from the 
logistic difficulties, it would be difficult politically to decide in favor of such a massive culling policy, 
as the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, in view of public opinion in The 
Netherlands, has declared it their policy to resort to emergency vaccination strategies instead.  
As far as emergency vaccination around infected farms is concerned we note the following. On the 
one hand it is highly unlikely that vaccination can be effective once a highly pathogenic virus has 
successfully been introduced in a densely populated poultry region. The reason is that it takes at 
least a week to vaccinate all susceptible poultry and an additional 7-14 days before a vaccine 
provides effective protection against infection and subsequent transmission [25]. This time span 
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would give the virus ample opportunity to spread throughout the area. On the other hand, 
vaccination is increasingly being considered as a possible tool to prevent the successful 
introduction of the disease in certain high-risk areas in case a highly pathogenic virus has been 
detected at a certain distance from the area. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we have presented an analysis of the spatial transmission dynamics of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus spread between farms by using an extensive dataset of a major 
epidemic of H7N7 avian influenza virus in The Netherlands in 2003. As the specific transmission 
route responsible for infection is unknown for all of the infected farms, we have adopted a 
phenomenological modelling approach in which we do not distinguish between different specific 
routes contributing to between-farm virus transmission. This allows us to obtain quantitative 
estimates of model transmission rate parameters that describe the transmission risk between pairs 
of farms as a function of distance.  
We have shown how the estimation of the transmission kernel naturally leads to estimates of a local 
reproduction number, which allows one to map out the transmission risk geographically. In this way, 
two poultry-dense areas at risk of local epidemic spread are identified in The Netherlands. The local 
reproduction number can be interpreted as a measure of the local farm density or, more precisely, 
as a measure of the density of farms surrounding a farm at a given location. As a result we may 
view the geographic risk map as a farm density map. In particular, the critical farm density above 
which epidemic spread is possible corresponds to a situation where the local reproduction number 
equals the threshold value 1. 
The density of poultry farms happens to differ quite strongly between the high-risk areas and 
elsewhere in The Netherlands. For instance, while the average farm density in the two areas that 
were classified in our analyses as high-risk (913 farms) is about 3.8 farms/km2, the average density 
in the remainder of the Netherlands (4447 farms) was only about 0.5 farms/km2. This corresponds 
well with eqn. (3) which predicts that for the kernel estimate of Table 1 the critical farm density in a 
spatially homogeneous population would be 2.9 farms/km2. As a result of the large differences in 
poultry densities in The Netherlands, moderate changes in the transmission kernel have very little 
effect on the important features of the risk map, in particular the location and the size of the high-
risk areas. Due to this insensitivity, our results are robust under variation of uncertain parameters.  
By adjusting the transmission kernel we have also produced risk maps that evaluate the 
effectiveness of pre-emptive ring culling around infected farms. These risk maps show that pre-
emptive culling within three kilometres or less is unlikely to be able to halt an unfolding epidemic in 
the high-risk areas. In these areas an epidemic can only be brought to an end by the depletion of 
susceptible farms by infection or massive culling. Our analyses indicate that in the high-density 
areas in The Netherlands ring culling is only effective (in the sense that it can halt an unfolding 
epidemic) if the culling radius is more than three kilometres. On the other hand, our analyses also 
show that in the remainder of The Netherlands (i.e. the large low-density areas of Figure 3) pre-
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emptive culling is probably not necessary to halt the disease from spreading after a primary 
introduction. 
An important open problem is whether culling or vaccination programmes are able to reduce the 
total number of animals that would die during an epidemic (by infection or culling) as compared to a 
strategy in which only a movement ban and biosecurity measures are put in place. During the 
epidemic of the highly pathogenic H7N7 avian influenza virus that wreaked havoc in The 
Netherlands in 2003 it was decided, on the basis of the then available epidemiological and 
economic information and legislative constraints to put in place an aggressive control strategy of 
which culling around infected premises formed an integral part. Based on the present analyses we 
would expect that an introduction of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in one of the poultry-
dense areas in The Netherlands cannot easily be contained, and probably would affect a large 
fraction of the farms in such a region. However, some form of preventive culling around infected 
premises would still pay off as it would decrease the length and severity of the epidemic in this 
region, and thereby also reduce the risk of spread of the disease to other (high-density) areas. 
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analysis 0ˆh (day-1) 0ˆr (km) αˆ  Tˆ (day) 
default 0.0020 (0.0012-0.0039) 1.9 (1.1-2.9) 2.1 (1.8-2.4) 7.5 (7.2-7.8) 
extended range 0.0013 (0.0009-0.0021) 3.1 (2.3-4.1) 2.7 (2.5-3.0)  7.5 (7.2-7.8) 
short infectious period 0.0028 (0.0017-0.0049) 1.8 (1.1-2.9) 2.1 (1.8-2.4) 5.5 (5.2-5.8) 
high-risk period 0.0078 (0.0037-0.030) 1.8 (0.65-2.9) 3.9 (2.4-6.9) 13.8 (11.4-16.2) 
low-risk period 0.00052 (0.00035-0.0011) 5.4 (2.8-9.2) 2.5 (2.0-3.1) 7.3 (7.1-7.6) 
 
Table 1.  Maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters. The parameters 0h , 0r  and α  
determine the transmission kernel (eqn. (6)), while T  represents the infectious period at the farm 
level. 95% confidence intervals are given between brackets. The first row gives the results for the 
default analysis discussed in the main text. The second row gives the parameter estimates for a 
model with an extended kernel range which takes into account the density of farms in Europe 
outside of The Netherlands. The third row shows the results in case of a decrease in the infectious 
period at the farm level of two days. The last two rows show the results of analyses in which the 
periods before and after March 1 are analyzed separately (high-risk period and low-risk period). The 
infectious periods of the high-risk and low-risk periods are based on 5 and 236 farms, respectively.  
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 transmission kernel AIC model weight 
( ) 0hrh =  3910.22 0 
( )
r
hrh
+
=
1
0
 3465.15 0 
( ) 201 r
hrh
+
=  3678.87 0 
( )
αr
hrh
+
=
1
0
 3094.24 0.16 
( ) ( )α0
0
1 rr
hrh
+
=  3090.99 0.84 
 
Table 2. Evaluation of the performance of different transmission kernels. The first column gives the 
functional form of the transmission kernel. The second and third columns represent Akaike’s 
Information Criterion [23] and corresponding model weight, which can be interpreted as the 
probability that the chosen model is the best among the ones considered. The rows show the 
results of analyses using transmission kernels that increase in complexity from top to bottom. The 
three-parameter transmission kernel in the bottom row has the highest support forms the basis of 
the analyses leading to Figures 3-5. 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. Map of The Netherlands indicating the physical locations of all 5360 commercial poultry 
farms. Farms that were not infected during the 2003 epidemic of avian influenza are represented by 
a yellow dot. Farms that were infected during the 2003 epidemic are represented by a black dot.   
 
Figure 2. A) The frequency distribution of the distances of potential infection events. Notice that the 
majority of potential infections occur within a radius of 25 km around an infected farm. B) The 
proportion of farms infected within different distance categories from a potential source farm, 
averaged over all possible source farms (i.e. over all farms confirmed positive during the 2003 
epidemic).  
 
Figure 3. The transmission kernel as a function of inter-farm distance for the parameter estimates of 
Table 1. The 95% confidence areas of the transmission kernel are represented by the shaded area. 
 
Figure 4. High-risk areas for epidemic spread of avian influenza virus based on the transmission 
kernel of Figure 3 (see Table 1 for parameter estimates). For each farm an individual reproduction 
number iR  is calculated on the basis of eqn. (5). Infected farms with 1<iR  infect, on average, 
less than 1 susceptible farm and pose no risk for epidemic spread (yellow dots). Infected farms with 
1>iR  are expected to infect more than 1 susceptible farm in the early stage of an epidemic and 
thus constitute a risk of epidemic spread (red dots). Pink dots represent farms with 1<iR  for the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the transmission kernel, but with 1>iR  for the upper bound of the 
95% kernel confidence area (Figure 3). Notice that most of the farms that were infected during the 
epidemic in The Netherlands in 2003 (Figure 1) are classified as high-risk farms. 
 
Figure 5. High-risk areas for epidemic spread for various local culling strategies in the central high-
risk area of The Netherlands (see Figure 4). Panel A shows the results for the default scenario (no 
culling). Panel B gives the results for a scenario with immediate culling of all farms within a range of 
1 km around an infected farm. In panels C and D culling is carried out in a range of 3 and 5 km 
around infected farms, respectively. Farms in yellow pose no risk of epidemic spread for the chosen 
control strategy, while farms in red constitute a risk of epidemic spread even with the control 
strategy in place.  
 
 
Online material 
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Dataset S1. Infection status over time of all 241 farms that were infected during the epidemic of 
highly pathogenic H7N7 avian influenza virus in The Netherlands. Each line gives the infection 
status (S, E, I ,R) per day per farm.  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
 
 
                                                                25                                                                     27/2/07 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
  
